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Am I that Race?
Punjabi Mexicans and Hybrid Subjectivity, or
How To Do Theory So That It Doesn't Do You
FalguniA. Sheth*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the conceptual and racial status of "Punjabi
Mexicans" at the turn of the twentieth century. I refer primarily to
marriages between East Indian men and Mexican or Mexican-American
women on the West Coast and in the Southwestern United States. The
scant information available about these alliances has been uncovered by
several historians and an anthropologist.' In that literature, this group
appears to be a "given," i.e., it is portrayed as a coherent identity that
emerges from a simple set of circumstances.2 Yet, it is anything but a
given; its existence and its collective and individual consciousness is
created out of a complex nexus of legal, political, social, and natural
environments that spurred the migration of East Indian men and Mexican
women from their homelands and to their adopted lands. I am interested in
* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Political Theory, Hampshire College. Ph.D.
and M.A., New School for Social Research; B.A., UC Berkeley. Portions of this article
have appeared, albeit in regard to a different argument, in the author's recent book, Toward
a PoliticalPhilosophy of Race. See FALGUNI A. SHETH, TOWARD A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

OF RACE (Albany: SUNY Press 2009). The author began writing this paper while she was a
visiting scholar in the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley and in the Department
of Philosophy at University of San Francisco. The author would like to thank David Kim,
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Robert E. Prasch, Mickaella Perina, and audiences at the UC
Berkeley Ethnic Studies Department, Caribbean Philosophical Association Meetings in
Guadeloupe, Society for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy Meetings in
Chicago, Illinois, for their insightful questions, comments, and suggestions.
1. See JOAN JENSEN, PASSAGE FROM INDIA: ASIAN INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN NORTH
AMERICA (Yale University Press 1988); KAREN LEONARD, MAKING ETHNIC CHOICES:
CALIFORNIA'S PUNJABI MEXICAN AMERICANS (Temple University Press 1992); Nayan Shah,
Adjudicating Intimacies on the U.S. Frontiers, in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF
INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (Ann Laura Stoler ed., Duke University Press

2006). Karen Leonard also conducts a literature survey of those who have mentioned or
discussed Punjabi migrants in the course of their work. See Karen Leonard, Historical
Constructions of Ethnicity: Research on Punjabi Immigrants in California, 12 J. AM.
ETHNIC HIST. 3-26 (Summer 1993).

2. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 1. Leonard points to the identity of this population
by highlighting the fact of these marriages. I shall argue the circumstances surrounding
these marriages, and the identities of these couples were anything but simple or given.
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examining the collective consciousness of individuals who are located in
the same moment, but who are living in distinct but overlapping contexts.
The structural sources laws, institutions, explicit and implicit
prohibitions, cultural trends, and economic interests - converge to give
this population its subjectivity. By subjectivity, I refer to the complex
existence of human beings, whose self-understanding is found in the nexus
of historical, political, and social circumstances; juridical and social
institutions such as laws and government; as well as in their creativity and
imagination in negotiating and resisting those circumstances in order to
survive or flourish. In other words, as Michel Foucault says, "There are
two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or selfknowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and
makes subject to."' 3 In other words, by understanding human beings as
subjects rather than as individuals whose identities are constrained by
monochromatic narratives of "rationality" or "irrationality," we can
understand their "subjectivity" as emerging from the complex interstices of
power.
As I will go on to argue, this group can and should be understood as
having a hybrid subjectivity, that is, one which places them in the
interstices of multiple identities - as a racial group, as an ethnic
population, as a "mixed-race" community - and can shift in and out of
different contexts as they fit the objectives of legal institutions (as "aliens
ineligible to citizenship ' 4 and as property holders simultaneously), political
institutions (as undesirable immigrants), and social institutions (as mixed
race and non-white or brown folks). Hybrid subjectivity should be a
category that can enable us as scholars, practicing attorneys, and as astute
students of history, to understand the complex conceptual and existential
location of a range of populations who do not fit easily into one category.
In this case - as I discuss further on - Punjabi Mexicans can be seen in
several categories simultaneously, and their existence as "subaltern
cosmopolitans" can help us to challenge certain predominant categories
that appear to be "neutral" when in fact they are laden with class-based,
race-based, and other problematic theoretical biases.
This population has been missed - or remained unseen - in the
theoretical frameworks within American race discourse, post-colonial
studies, and subaltern studies. Three scholars have discussed Punjabi
Mexicans in an extensive fashion. The informative method used by Karen
Leonard is a standard anthropological approach which records and
documents various features of this group's existence through oral

3. Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 781 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Alien Property Initiative Act of 1920 (also known as the California Alien
Land Act of 1920), 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944).
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interviews and primary documents such as county clerk records and
marriage licenses. 5 Nayan Shah's insightful work focuses on the some of
the exigencies of the populations, utilizing a Foucaultian approach to
understand how legal and regulatory structures have shaped subjectivity.6
Joan Jensen's careful research has gestured to this group during the course
of a longer history about "Asian Indians" in California, again through
various primary historical documents. Their research has been crucial to
the documentation of this group's existence. However, these scholars have
not generally drawn on post-colonial theory, subaltern studies, or American
race discourse, all of which have been considered helpful by scholars in
American and Ethnic studies for highlighting the perspectives of diasporic
subjects. 8 Moreover, scholars who utilize post-colonial theory, subaltern
studies, and American race discourses have not extensively explored the
subjectivity of this particular population - by which I mean developing
careful or extensive accounts of this group's collective and hybrid
consciousness. Consequently, in this article, I ask what might account for
this eclipse and others like it in some of the most compelling scholarly
literatures that focus on exploited, undervalued, or otherwise neglected
populations. One way to do this would be to address the question of what
it means to be Punjabi Mexican for the first generation partners in these
alliances. I want also to consider some respectful new ways to understand
such hybrid subjectivities that are missed through these filters.
II. 'MEXICAN HINDUS:' AN INITIAL SKETCH
The histories of these men and women are distinct. The men were
from India, mostly from the Punjab region; most were Sikh, some Muslim,
still others Hindu. 9 Initially, they arrived in Vancouver, 10 amidst much
violence and controversy, to replace Chinese and Japanese workers who
had already been the targets of exclusion laws." In many ways, the social
situation and legal status of Asian Indians in the United States replicated
the experiences of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean immigrants.
Disfranchised after working on railroads and in lumber, and subject to mob
5. See LEONARD, supra note 1.
6. See Shah, supra note 1.
7. See JENSEN, supra note 1.
8 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?: Speculations on Widow
Sacrifice, 7/8 WEDGE 120, 120-30; Dipesh Chakrabarty, A Short History of Subaltern
Studies, in HABITATIONS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS IN THE WAKE OF SUBALTERN STUDIES 3
(2002); ANN DUCILLE, SKIN TRADE 131 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1996).

9. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 24; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 66.
10. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 24.
11. Referring to the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the informal Gentlemen's
Agreement (1907), struck between the U.S. and Japan, whereby the Japanese government
agreed to withhold the distribution of passports to Japanese laborers who wished to emigrate
to the United States. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1365, at 15 (1952) (describing the history of the Gentlemen's Agreement).
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actions and riots, they were driven southwards from Vancouver, through
Washington State and Oregon. 12 Many finally settled throughout Northern
and Southern
California, from Marysville to Yuba City, and in the Imperial
13
Valley.
The women were either from Mexico (Chihuahua and Mexicali, among
other regions) or of Mexican descent and born in the United States. 14 They
migrated to or grew up in El Paso, Yuma, Las Cruces, Calexico, among
other places Southwest. 15 They were nearly all Catholic. Despite these
differences of origin, and those of caste, class, and ethnic identity, Punjabi
men and their spouses were referred to publicly as "Mexican Hindus," as
were their children, 16 even though they were raised as Catholic by their
Mexican mothers. 17 Although we only have scant knowledge of this
community, there is evidence that many in this group - men and women
alike - understood themselves as "Hindu,"
even when their backgrounds
18
were Muslim, Sikh, Catholic, or Mexican.
How we should understand them should of course be highly dependent
upon how they framed themselves.' 9 However, to a large degree, how they
framed themselves had much to do with how they were recognized and
shaped by United States immigration, criminal, military, property, and
marriage laws, 2° as well as by the needs of this population to try to remain
"on the right side" of the law - to avoid being criminalized; little stood
between them and jail, forced impoverishment, deportation, moral
condemnation, and general hatred and vilification. In addition, their selfunderstanding was shaped by their needs for intimate companionship,
social networks, and economic alliances, as well as their desire for
economic security and property, political status, and psychic well-being. 2'
Yet, how they recognized themselves and were recognized has nearly no
place in some of the major theoretical frameworks by which we commonly
understand the "Other., 22 In what follows, I want to explore the contours

12. JENSEN, supra note 1,at 29-32.
13. Id. at 34.
14. See LEONARD, supra note 1,at 4,63.
15. Id. at 63-78.
16. As Leonard notes, "[T]he children also answered to... 'halfand half."' Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 92.
18. Id.at 4,116.
19. Here I will follow Leonard's practice of referring to the couples as "PunjabiMexican." Id. at 5.
20. Inthis paper, Iwill discuss the broad structural outlines of the marriage and property
laws that impelled Punjabi men and Latina/Mexican women together. Elsewhere, I discuss
inmore detail the property, immigration, military, constitutional, and conspiracy laws that
served to racialize Asian-Indian men. See generally FALGUNI A. SHETH, TOWARD A
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RACE 147-66 (SUNYPress 2009).
21. LEONARD, supra note 1,at 70-71.
22. See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 104 (A.V. Miller trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1807); EMMANUEL LEVINAS, OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR
BEYOND ESSENCE 159 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991) (1974).
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of this group by considering how they tried to remain invisible then and
how they remain invisible today. The specific factors are different, but
they have this in common: They were legally marginalized then, and they
are eclipsed today for being the "wrong" race - one that has no proper
place in the American race discourse nor in contemporary post-colonial and
subaltern studies. With that, let me begin this story.
Somewhere between 5,500 and 7,000 South-Asian men - mostly
Punjabi Sikhs - migrated to the western coast of the United States during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.23 This population
consisted of several classes of men. Some were students, some were
political activists who, by the beginning of the twentieth century, were
agitating for Self-Rule in India from the traditional political spaces of
American university towns and other cities. 24 Others were laborers who
had come seeking higher wages and a chance to send remittances home or
to build their lives anew on the North American continent.25 This essay
focuses primarily on this last group; however, members of this group also
26
occasionally overlap with the groups of students and political activists.
Over that thirty-year period, Punjabi laborers managed to secure
property, businesses, and farms throughout California and elsewhere in the
Southwest. 27 As their presence grew, they - along with their student and
activist counterparts - were perceived as yet another controversial wave
of dark people, this time as "Hindoos,, 28 "coolies," and "rag-heads, 2 9 who

23. It is difficult to discern the exact number because the tables record immigrant
arrivals based on country of last permanent residence and country of birth. These figures
estimate approximately 5,000 Asian Indians residing in the U.S. during this period. FROM
INDIA TO AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION, PROBLEMS OF DISCRIMINATION,
ADMISSION AND ASSIMILATION 88, Tbls. 2 & 3 (S. Chandrasekhar ed., 1982). Padma
Rangaswamy estimates that 7,000 Indians entered the U.S. between 1904-1920. PADMA
RANGASWAMY, NAMASTE AMERICA: INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN AN AMERICAN METROPOLIS 42
(2000). These numbers are consistent with the estimates given by Jensen and Leonard.
JENSEN, supra note 1, at 15-16; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 24. Shah estimates that the
number of Indian immigrants around this time was as high as 25,000, although he includes
both Canada and the United States. Shah, supra note 1, at 119. I have discussed this
population's movements in detail elsewhere. See Falguni A. Sheth, The Eclipse of Early
Twentieth Century Asian Indian Immigration in American Racial and Post-Colonial
Discourses, in PHILOSOPHY TODAY: SPECIAL EDITION ON ASIAN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

(David Kim & Ronald R. Sundstrom eds.) (forthcoming).
24. This group has had a few scholarly admirers. See, e.g., HAROLD GOULD, SIKHS,
SWAMIS, STUDENTS AND SPIES: THE INDIA LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES 1900-1946 (Sage
Publications 2006); JENSEN, supra note 1.
25. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 25.
26. See id. at 16.
27. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 55, 65-68.
28. There is some disagreement over whether the term refers to the religion or is a
shortened term for "Hindustani." Jensen suggests the former. See JENSEN, supra note 1.
Leonard and Shah suggest the latter. See LEONARD, supra note 1; Shah, supra note 1. Most
were Punjabi Sikhs who had converted from Hinduism under pressure in the British colonial
army in India. The stylized spelling of the term suggests its polemical tone.
29. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 44.
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had invaded the white provinces of North America. They were also
perceived with hostility by other ethnic groups, 30 and were targets of
xenophobic organizations such as the San Francisco-based Asiatic
Exclusion League, originally the "Japanese and Korean Exclusion League,"
renamed in 1907 so as to include a broader range of targets.3 1
By the beginning of the twentieth century, some portion of this group
of men began to merge their economic and social resources to purchase
farmland and other businesses throughout California, and due to legal
hostility in the form of Alien Land Acts, moved to other parts of the
Southwest.32 This population consisted almost entirely of men, who began
to join forces with women from other ethnic or racial populations in marital
partnerships. 33 A small number of South-Asian men married Anglo
women, when they were permitted.34 An even smaller group of Punjabi
men forged partnerships with Black women. 35 The bulk of Punjabi men
who were involved in marital alliances did so with Mexican or MexicanAmerican women.36 It is difficult to estimate how many such alliances
occurred.
In California, between 1913 and 1949, there were at
approximately 300 marriages between Asian-Indian men and Latina
women, and approximately sixty marriages between Asian-Indian men and
Black, Native-American, or Anglo women.37 According to Leonard's
remarks, it appears that as many as 2,000 such partnerships occurred
throughout the western United States. 38 Of the Latina women, I have been
able - so far - to find very little.3 9 Many were migrating from Mexico,
most likely due to the 1910 Mexican Revolution. 40 They too were from
agricultural families. Some of them migrated up to El Paso, others have
found their way over to Calexico.42 Like their Punjabi counterparts, a
number of these women had left spouses and families in Mexico. 43 I will
30. Such as Japanese immigrants. Id. at 40.
31. Id. at 44.
32. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 71.
33. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 40; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 63-64.
34. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 67.
35. This group most likely consisted primarily of African-American women, although I
have not been able to confirm this fact as of yet. "Black" was the description that was
accorded to them in the media and legal statutes of the day. Id. at 67.
36. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 40; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 67.
37. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 67.
38. The number is based on Leonard's research of 1,800-2,000 marriage licenses and the
most common racial terminology used to refer to these partnerships ("brown"). Id. at 10.
Her figure appears to include second-generation partnerships involving the children of such
alliances and to include marriages that occurred until approximately 1960.
39. See Bruce LaBrack & Karen Leonard, Conflict and Compatibility in PunjabiMexican Immigrant Families in Rural California, 1915-1965, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527,
528 (1984).
40.

See JENSEN, supra note 1, at 40; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 63-64.

41. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 63.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 113-14.
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return to the details of this population after considering the reasons for their
invisibility in the post-colonial and subaltern studies literature.
There were several discernible reasons for these pairings. The
foremost reason was the inability of Punjabi men to bring their fiancres or
spouses from India, due to the difficulties in obtaining permission from the
United States government. a Indian men were hindered in their ability to
marry freely within the context of United States miscegenation laws,
although it is difficult to know precisely to what degree and purpose this
factor worked, as these laws were primarily directed at partnerships
between men of color and White women. The story is of course more
complicated than simple prohibitions. As Peggy Pascoe observes of
miscegenation laws,
[T]he laws were applied most stringently to groups like the
Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos, whose men were thought likely
to marry white women. They were applied least stringently to
groups like the Native Americans (who were inconsistently
mentioned in the laws) and Hispanics (who were not mentioned at
all), groups
whose women were historically likely to marry white
45
men.
Pascoe notes that while East-Indian men were technically Asians, they
were not given the most prominent focus in the construction of anti-Asian
miscegenation laws. The first exogamous marriages by Asian-Indian men
appear to have occurred in the early 1910s in El Paso, Texas, where a
number of Latina women settled after migrating during the Mexican
Revolution.4 6 Other exogamous marriages occurred in California soon
thereafter, 47 but miscegenation laws passed in California or Arizona did not
name Asian Indians either directly or indirectly until 1931.48 This
"reprieve," along with the fact that Mexican women were not considered to
be a threat to the social engineering plans of U.S. politicians, 49 enabled
these alliances to be forged despite the watchful eyes of the state. While
many of the West Coast miscegenation laws were placed on the books
beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, those laws prohibited

44. A number of men had already been married and had children before arriving in the
United States. See id. at 115.
45. Peggy Pascoe, Race, Gender, and InterculturalRelations: The Case of Interracial

Marriage, 12 FRONTIERS 5, 7 (1991).
46. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 64.
47. Leonard records the first Punjabi-Mexican marriage in the Imperial Valley in 1916.
Id. at 64. Pascoe also indicates that Virginia named Asian Indians in its miscegenation laws
in 1924, and Georgia did so in 1927. Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and
Ideologies of 'Race'in Twentieth-CenturyAmerica, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44,49 n. 13 (1996).
48. Pascoe, supra note 47, at 49 n.13.
49. As evidenced by the fact that although women who married aliens were ineligible to
citizenship became ineligible to citizenship, hence to property ownership, a few held land in
their own names even while married to Asian-Indian men. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 57.
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"mixed-race" marriages between whites (mostly women) and those of
Mongolian, mulatto, colored, and (eventually) Malay (Filipino) descent. 50
There does appear to be an additional stipulation that marriage licenses
could5 only be awarded to those who were understood to be of the same
race. '
There were also a set of economic interests that might have led to the
trend in partnerships between Asian-Indian men and Mexican or MexicanAmerican women. By 1920, two Alien Land Acts effectively disfranchised
Japanese Americans and along with them, South Asians and other "aliens
ineligible to naturalization" of the ability to own or hold land for more than
short time periods, and prohibited them from establishing trusteeships in
the names of friends or family to guard over the land.52 These laws would
have impoverished thousands of Punjabis who had managed to pool
resources and effectively purchases millions of dollars in California
farmland throughout Yuba and Sutter counties and surrounding areas, and
through much of the Imperial Valley.5 3 Despite the ambiguous citizenship
status of Mexican women under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,54
they risked their citizenship by marrying "aliens ineligible to citizenship."
It seems that these Mexican women were not perceived to be enough of a
threat to the state to have their citizenship or rights to own land stripped
from them. 55 Their Punjabi spouses managed to successfully transfer their
titles to their wives, and ultimately to their United States born children,
although not without contestation by the American government.56
III. APPROACHES IN POST-COLONIAL AND SUBALTERN
STUDIES LITERATURE: MYOPIAS AND ECLIPSES
Elsewhere I have discussed some of the relevant myopias of American
race discourse. 57 Here I will restrict my exploration to the post-colonial
and subaltern studies literatures. Post-colonial literature in the United
States reflects a model of diasporic citizenship that can be seen most
vividly during the post-1965 immigration to the United States. It reflects
the concerns of "Third World" diasporic subjects, many of whom were

50. Pascoe, supra note 47, at 49.
51. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 68.
52. See 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxii; ARIZ. REV. CODE §§ 2782-90 (1928). See generally Keith
Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century 'Alien Land Laws'As a Prelude to
Internment, 40 B.C. L. REv. 37 (1998).
53. See 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxii; ARIZ. REv. CODE §§ 2782-90 (1928).
54. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico
(also known as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
55. See Pascoe, supra note 47, at 49.
56. Karen Leonard, PunjabiFarmersand California'sAlien Land Law, 59 AGRIC. HIST.
549, 549-62 (1985).
57. See generally SHETH, supra note 20, at 147-66.
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academics or otherwise professionally employed. 58 Through the range of
topics explored by these literatures, scholars in these discourses have begun
to reflect on what it might mean to have a hybrid subjectivity. Generally
they have done so through a particular template: for example, by exploring
the cultural and political status of subjects in the post-colonial context subjects who traverse back and forth across borders and geographic
locations. Who they "are" at any given time depends in part on how they
are understood and interpellated. As Alexander and Mohanty note of their
existence in the United States, "We were not born women of color, but
became women of color here [in the United States]." 5 9 Similarly, the
particular category that applies to a group will change depending upon the
political, legal, and historical circumstances of the location in which they
are found. However, it also depends in part on the conditions of
recognition. For example, with whom must one be allied in order to be
recognized -

or conversely -

from whom must one distance oneself in

order to avoid being targeted by law? In the case of Punjabi men, as for
Filipinos, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants, as long as they generally
avoided the company of white women (and men), they could also avoid one
instance of the wrath of law. 60 Another question: how does one reposition
oneself so as to live in the interstices - the shadows - of law? Mexican
women - so long as their alliances were with other relatively marginalized
people - could similarly avoid the harsh glare of criminality. It is
certainly the case that Mexican women engaged in alliances with Anglo
men during the latter half of the nineteenth century, avoided the
intervention of the state, perhaps even "muting the ethnic hostility in other
comers of the Southwest., 61 But these partnerships were mainly between
the upper-class daughters of California rancheros and "Hispanicized
Anglos" who were "merchants and adventurers." Such partnerships often
"smoothed the transition into American rule.",62 In contrast, Punjabi men
partnered with women from similar class backgrounds, usually those from
agricultural or laboring backgrounds, who had left Mexico due to the

58. This literature is too wide-ranging and disparate to list definitively; however, the
following is a sample of writings that reflect these traits and describe some of the writings
that fall under the rubric of "post-colonial" theory. See, e.g., LEELA GANDHI, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY (Columbia Univ. Press 1998); DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING
EUROPE: POST-COLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (Princeton Univ. Press
2000); CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING

THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY (Duke Univ. Press 2003).
59. M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST
GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES xiv (M. Jacqui Alexander &

Chandra Talpade Mohanty eds., Routledge 1997).
60.

MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: THE MAKING OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN AMERICA 109

(Princeton Univ. Press 2004).

61. Darlis A. Miller, Cross-Cultural Marriages in the Southwest: The New Mexico
Experience 1846-1900, 57 N.M. L. REv. 335, 335-59 (1982).
62. Id. at 337.
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Mexican Revolution.63 Both were a part of marginalized populations, and,
as I argue below, they often partnered in order to survive better the "ruling
elite's" punitive dictums.
Post-colonial theorist Gayatri Spivak recognizes that in conventional
historical and political discourses, "[w]hite men are saving brown women
from brown men." 64 And often, the tendency of post-colonial theory is to
challenge this rescue narrative by "letting" the "subaltern" speak.6 5
Subaltern studies, taking its lead from this point, attempts to give voice to
the subaltern and to attend to the relationship of power from the ground up.
Thus, it attempts to find clues to the consciousness of the subaltern in the
instances of rebellion, of insurgency, and of violence as this group rises up
against colonial power. This construction of discourse is functional insofar
as the subaltern in question is recognized or at least goes through some
machinations in order to be recognized. This model works for studying, for
example, the events surrounding the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, 66 or the political
strategies and dynamics surrounding the famous Gandhian salt march of
1930.67 The subaltern population, though of different ethnic backgrounds,
can be construed through this discourse as members of the same
"subaltern" group, engaged in a concerted resistance practice that can be
traced because of its public visibility. The above framework functions best
for recognizing and "letting the subaltern speak," when subaltern subjects
make their presence known through acts or moments that are designed to
be visible, public, and explosive.
Here, however, the following question arises: Is it possible to cognize
the subaltern in contexts in which she, he, or they are not the insurgents
rising up, but are rather the "unlikely heroes" or invisible subjects? The
predominant preconceptions by which subaltern subjects have been
framed - e.g., as exploited or oppressed - offer little room to navigate
and articulate one's agency within the parameters of a traditional resistance
narrative. Through this lens, if the subaltern does not express resistance
through an insurgency narrative, it becomes nearly impossible to recognize
him or her as anything but a rebel. Perhaps because of the various myopias
of the scholar, the subjects are not considered "authentic" or subjects who
have a "coherent" identities, that is, identities that are legally, politically, or
formally acknowledged. It is difficult to find recognition or protection in a
legal system or even an intellectual framework that does not acknowledge

63. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 63.
64" Spivak, supra note 8, at 120-30.
65. Taken from Dipesh Chakrabarty, A Short History of Subaltern Studies, in
HABITATIONS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS 1N THE WAKE OF SUBALTERN STUDIES 17 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 2002) (citing Spivak, supra note 8).
66. See, e.g., THOMAS R. METCALF, THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLT: INDIA, 1857-70
(Manohar 1990).
67. See, e.g., DENNIS DALTON, MAHATMA GANDHI: NONVIOLENT POWER IN ACTION
(Colum. Univ. Press 1993).
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the legitimate existence of an individual.68 In the situation under scrutiny,
lack of legal acknowledgment can actually work to an individual's or
group's advantage, in that one can exist within the "brown" shadows. To
put it bluntly: What if Brown women and men are saving themselves from
white men? What if these brown women are different from the brown
women who were left behind by the other brown men? What if the second
group of brown women and brown men saved each other? Quietly,
unexplosively, and without the usual insurgencies, rebellions, and violence
that often attend standard histories? And how are these brown women (and
men) to be recognized when they do not fit neatly into a pre-existing
framework that considers primarily obvious heroes rather than quiet
survivors?
To return to Alexander and Mohanty, "[flrom African American and
United States women of color, we learned the peculiar brand of United
States North American racism and its constricted boundaries of race, 6 9
namely the practice of ignoring the existence of groups who are not linked
to an obvious political or historical framework, such as that of Black-White
relations or White-Brown dynamics. This "peculiar brand of racism"
dominates the discourse in such a way that it conceals other variants, which
themselves go unrecognized. To return to the case with which I began,
Asian-Indian men sit squarely in the middle of a colonial era, moving
through a range of sovereign and colonized regions to the United States.
Similarly, Mexican women are moving from a nation whose borders and
sovereignty are in conflict, colonized, and otherwise ambiguously marked.
These men and women and their families are migrating, laboring, and
surviving not merely in rebellion, but rather often in order to negotiate,
navigate, and circumnavigate the conditions that seem to ensconce them.
As Deepika Bahri indicates, geographic location is one of the
constitutive and ideological features of post-colonial theory:
The de facto prominence of the Third World as a geographically
authentic place of origin [is predictable;] the term "native" [is]
more readily associated with the darker races peopling the Third
World. Of course, the Third World is also a conceptual and
ideological space identified with marginality and/or subversion, as
long as there is some socially recognizable coordinate - such as
origin or race - with which this space can overlap.70

68. There are compelling political and intellectual arguments for this point. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989). See also Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian
Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567 (1990).
69. Alexander & Mohanty, supra note 59, at xiv.
70.

DEEPIKA BAHRI, NATIVE INTELLIGENCE: AESTHETICS, POLITICS, AND POST-COLONIAL
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Was India - one of the primary sites of the British colonial
government in 1850, 1880, 1900, and 1920 - the "Third World" at that
moment? Was Mexico the "Third World" in 1880? They were certainly
stamped by colonial impositions, in terms of the British (in India) and the
Spanish, France, and the United States (in Mexico) - this they have in
common. But can they be accounted for - ideologically and temporally in
relation to geography - by post-colonial theory? If we consider the
Mexican women who partnered with Punjabi men, and how little work has
been done on them, Bahri's analysis may serve to explain why: not only are
they not from a recognizable "Third World," but they are the wrong kind of
"native," and again, within the context of American race discourse, the
wrong kind of "race."
South-Asian male farmers and laborers in the United States in the early
1900's are not seen by theorists as post-colonial subjects, although they
shared with their more traditional counterparts who are the subject of postcolonial studies the features of being colonial subjects. They were also
expatriates, and in very subtle ways, rebels, in that they insisted on
circumventing those laws designed to disfranchise and marginalize them.71
They are not recognized as such in the framework of post-colonial theory.
Correlatively, the Mexican women were neither clearly colonial subjects
nor expatriates - or they might have been both - but clearly, they were
the incidental bystanders in an imperial trajectory beyond their control; one
notable moment was the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded
all of Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, parts of Colorado, and
Wyoming to the United States.72 It also initially gave Mexican nationals
residing in those areas dual Mexican and United States citizenship, and
guaranteed the civil and property rights of Mexican landowners, on the
condition that these subjects would have to elect to remain a citizen of one
country or the other within several years.73 However, within several years
the United States, which was generally hostile to the notion of property
rights for Mexican nationals, expressed its hostility through a series of
contradictory federal and state civil codes and equally conflicting case law
that quickly rendered those protections null. In addition, although all
Mexicans living within those territories were promised protection, Native
Americans had no legal recognition under this treaty. Neither did Mexican
women, even though they were recognized to have full property rights
under Mexican law. As Maria Montoya points out, "[b]y refusing to
recognize Mexican practices, U.S. courts stripped Mexican married women
of these rights, re-creating them as common-law dependents of the

Such as the Alien Land Laws and anti-miscegenation laws.
9 Stat. 922.
See MARIA MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL

LAND GRANT AND

THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840-1900 46-49

(Univ. Cal. Press

71.
72.
73.
2002).
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husband, master of the household., 74 For single women, these rights
became even more dubious. Thus, the 1848 Treaty rendered the citizenship
status of Mexican men and women fluid at best; ambiguous and unstable at
worst. The 1910 Mexican revolution marked another politically ambiguous
and tumultuous moment, displacing many peasants, and compelling men
and women to migrate to Texas, New Mexico, and California.
These two events frame the search for financial, political, and social
stability that characterize the situations of the Mexican women in question.
Their struggles are conducted in the shadows of law, as migrants,
agricultural workers, and laborers. These might overlap with the category
of the peasant who forms the foundation of post-colonial studies, but they
are not the insurgents who form the subjects of post-colonial studies.7 5
Although they are fundamentally marginalized subjects, they do not fall
easily into the conceptual categories of post-colonial theory because their
status as immigrants, non-citizens, and aliens render them even more
ambiguous and unstable. They are fundamentally racial subjects, but
because they are neither black nor white, they are not interpolated as such
within American racial discourse, except in their own day when they were
seen as "Hindu" or "brown" or even occasionally, as "white." The
"brown" people - such as I am speaking of - are difficult to theorize in
the extensive frameworks of post-colonial theory, never mind American
race theory and subaltern studies, because these narratives can only reflect
what they have been primed to catch. They cannot see what they are
prepared to filter out of the picture.
IV. HYBRID SUBJECTIVITY AND SUBALTERN
COSMOPOLITAN SUBJECTS
How can these men and women be seen, and seen accurately? To this
end, I want to propose the integration of the theoretical frameworks of
transnational and post-colonial theories, subaltern studies, and critical race
theory, in order to craft a theoretical lens designed to recognize subjects
whose survival depends on a subtle existence, and whose resistance to
efforts to disfranchise them politically and financially is neither aggressive
nor volatile, but rather expressed through lawful acts. By drawing on
Kimberl6 Crenshaw's notion of intersectionality, it becomes possible to
focus on individuals whose subject-positions are formed by multiple and
hybrid interests.76 Intersectionality, that is, looking through the lens of race
and class and gender, allows us to try to understand working-class Mexican

74.

See MONTOYA, supra note 73, at 48.

75.
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and Mexican-American women and the motivations for their migration to
parts of Southwestern United States; we can apply a similar lens to AsianIndian men. By integrating Crenshaw's account of intersectionality with
the lens of transnational feminist theory, which explores the location of
subjects in relation to borders and nations, and with a major premise of
subaltern studies (trying to see the subaltern on his or her own terms), we
are better equipped to see the multiple and hybrid subjectivity of Punjabi
Mexicans, whose citizenship, allegiances, and commitments shifted. They
did so partially by choice, but also in response to their economic, political,
and legal circumstances. Through the integration of these theoretical
frameworks, I suggest a new category: That of the diasporic cosmopolitan
subject, whom I will call the "subaltern cosmopolitan," 7 in order to
distinguish this subject from the cosmopolitans of abstract liberal theory,
for example, as proposed by Anthony Appiah,78 and to incorporate more of
the critical dimensions of cosmopolitanism as described by Walter
Mignolo.79
In the situation at hand, the men in question could be described as
"cosmopolitan" in that they have certain traits that are associated with
"cosmopolitanism." Once they left India, these men often lived and
worked in several countries around the globe under the expectation of
earning remittances to send to their families who remained in India. 80 They
worked in a range of professions: "One son was sent out to earn money, as
a policeman in Shanghai or Hong Kong or as a farm worker in the
Philippines, Australia, Africa, Canada," 81 and in the case at hand, finally
the United States. They probably spoke several languages - Punjabi,
Mandarin, Spanish, and English - learned in the course of their travels
and experiences.
But they have very little in common with the
cosmopolitan subjects of the post-1965 Indian diaspora.8 2 The former often
gave up their ties to their motherland entirely - from their religious
practices to their garb, and even their kinship ties.83 They had no
citizenship, no claims to land in the country where they settled, and often
had very tenuous ties to the partners whom they married: They were both

77. I have already used the term elsewhere but develop it substantially here. SHETH,
supra note 20, at 163. Credit to Robert Prasch for coining this phrase.
78. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS (W.W. Norton 2006).
79. See generally Walter Mignolo, The Many Faceof Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and
CriticalCosmopolitanism, in COSMOPOLITANISM 157 (Carol Breckenridge et al. eds., Duke
Univ. Press 2002).
80. JENSEN, supra note 1, at 24.
81. LaBrack & Leonard, supra note 39, at 527.
82. As represented by the characters in the writings of JHUMPA LAHIRI, THE NAMESAKE
(Mariner Books 2004); M.G. VASSANJI, THE IN-BETWEEN WORLD OF VIKRAM LALL (Knopft
2004); SALMAN RUSHDIE, SATANIC VERSES (Henry Holt 1988).
83. See generally Karen Leonard, Historical Constructions of Ethnicity: Research on
PunjabiImmigrants in California, 12 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3 (1993).
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'brown,' they appeared physically "similar," and they were legally
proscribed from marrying each other.8 4 Their "cosmopolitanism" results
not from a surplus of property, confidence, and definitive ties to other lands
or ascending populations, but from a lack of access to all of these.
Thus, Subaltern Cosmopolitans are certainly diasporic subjects, but
they are not era(c)ed 85 in the way that post-colonial theorists seem to have
been era(c)ed in the American imaginary - as non-raced and non-classed
migratory subjects who can fit into a range of contexts. As Ann duCille
points out: "The alterity of the Indian as post-colonial is generic,
categorical, locational, but, interestingly enough, not racial or at least not
racially specific. Race, it seems, is the proper attribute of black or African
people. 86 She continues, "In the United States, the racial status of Indians
and several other minorities
has varied with the political and social agenda
87
of the historical moment.",
V. SEEING ONESELF IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER
Subaltern cosmopolitanism, combined with the absence of the
recognition of race, might begin to account why Punjabi immigrants and
Mexican women in this context are ignored by both post-colonial and
American race literatures. But I think there is more to the story of Punjabi
Mexicans. We might begin to account for complex self-consciousness of
this group during this period by considering how their hybrid subjectivities
were shaped through the very conditions that brought them together: the
anti-miscegenation laws and the notable absence of Asian Indians and
Mexicans from this law. The 1901 California statute prohibited the
marriages of "Negroes," "Mulattoes," and "Mongolians" to whites. 88 In
terms of the explicit recognition afforded under this statute, "Mongolians"
were a reference to the Chinese population that had existed in California
well before the arrival of Asian Indians. However, Koreans and Japanese,
in addition to Chinese persons, were formally prohibited from marrying
whites under this law.
While there was a culturally widespread ethos against the marriage of
people from different races, Asian-Indian men and folks from Mexico or of
Mexican descent were generally neither acknowledged nor considered
threatening enough to be listed in this statute - at least until the 1920s and
1930s. Malayans (Filipinos) 89 and Asian Indians ("Hindus") were not
84. Mexican women, as aliens eligible for citizenship, would lose their eligibility by
marrying Punjabi men, who have been prohibited from owning land by the Alien Land Law.
However, this technicality seems to have been ignored. See Pascoe, supra note 47, at 49.
85. The term "era(c)ed" serves to exhibit a certain important irony.
86. ANN DUCILLE, SKIN TRADE 131 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
87. Id.
88. BRETr MELENDY, ASIANS IN AMERICA: FmptNos, KoREANs, INDIANS 52 n.30
(Hippocrene Books 1977) (citing 1901 CAL. STAT. TIT. XI).
89. Referring to Filipino men.
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officially prohibited from marrying white women under this statute until
1933. 9o Prior to 1931, Asian-Indian-white couples who wished to marry
met with varying degrees of success, depending upon the general outlook
of the town clerk and on the region where they attempted to do so. 91 These
statutes did not completely prevent white-"other" alliances; nor did they
seem as explicitly interested in preventing brown-black alliances.92
However, there was also the practical matter that those who wanted to
marry had to find a town clerk willing to list them as being of the same race
on the marriage certificate: whether Brown, Black, or White. 93 Sometime
after 1933, Mexican women began to identify themselves as "Indian" or of
"Indian descent" on their marriage applications, indicating the increasing
difficulties of circumventing miscegenation law's requirement that both
partners be of the same race.94
And so why did they turn to each other as likely marital partners?
Often subjectivity is - at least partially - constituted through the
interstices of regulations and legal statutes, as Foucault writes. 95 How one
understands oneself is often closely connected to how one is seen by the
law, the spaces where one is not seen by the law, and where (and how) it is
then safe to consider oneself. While Asian Indians may have been
tangentially understood as "Oriental," by and large this term was reserved
for East Asians. It is clear that "Hindus" were summarily perceived as the
worst of all immigrants in their turn, as the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans
had been before them. However, "Hindus" were generally considered a
group by themselves, consisting not only of Hindus (of which there were
very few) but Muslims and Sikhs from the Indian subcontinent as well.9 6
Mexican women similarly were not openly perceived as a threat, or at least
not to same degree that their male laboring counterparts were - at least not
yet in this context. Most likely, there are several reasons for this, about
which we still have more to learn. Perhaps precisely because they were the
"implicit" background figures in the public perception of Mexican men -

90. And in Arizona, they were officially included in 1931. See Pascoe, supra note 47, at
49 n.13.
91. One of the more visible examples was of Dalip Singh Saund, who became the first
South Asian congressman from California after Indians were again deemed citizens in 1946.
Saund married a (White) "American woman" around 1928. See JENSEN, supra note 1, at
280. Saund's wife, Marian Kosa Saund, was stripped of her citizenship for marrying an
alien. Portrait of Dalip Sigh Saund to be Unveiled in U.S., TIMES INDIA, Oct. 29, 2007,
availableat http://timesofmdia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2498416.cms.
92. See Pascoe, supra note 47, at 49 n. 13; LEONARD, supra note 1, at 67.
93. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 68.
94. See LaBrack & Leonard, supra note 39, at 558. Until then, "brown" was the primary
race of choice on marriage applications for Punjabi-Mexican alliances. LEONARD, supra
note 1, at 10.
95. See generally Foucault, supra note 3.
96. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 30.
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as wives, mothers, sisters, homemakers, and "domestic managers" was not anticipated that they would opt to marry Asian-Indian men.

it

VI. RACIAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE 1920s AND 1930s
Mae Ngai has argued that during the 1920s and 1930s, race and
nationality were understood to a degree as interchangeable in the context of
immigration laws. 97 As such, if we begin to understand these couples
within the context of the rhetoric and cultural ethos of the antimiscegenation statutes, we find, as they found, that they are similar
phenotypically and in terms of skin color, 98 which were the major public
signifiers of the race of the day. This might mark the beginning of a
self-understood racial similarity indeed the beginnings of a
"racialization" - whereby subject populations begin to transform into a
race through both the very absence of racial recognition afforded them and
their physical commonalities. This is not to say that this racialization was
imposed upon this community solely due to those external pressures;
rather, those pressures worked in concert with a self-conscious selfera(c)ure that took advantage of the ambiguities of law, the absence of
recognition, and the difficulties of interpellation by blending into the
"brown" shadows.
Very few ethnographic studies have been done on this population to
date. A major study done by Karen Leonard managed to capture some of
the thoughts of some of the Mexican women and Punjabi men, occasionally
through their children's recollections.99 What we know about them, if
Leonard's account can be trusted, is that both sides of these unions found
themselves to have much more in common, in terms of skin color and
phenotypically, than either group might have10 0had reason to have with
"Mulattoes," Blacks, or East Asians, or whites.
By 1992, when Leonard's account was published, the few remaining
Mexican-Hindu couples were fairly aged or had passed away, and the much
of the remaining testimony emerged from the recollections of their
children. According to their accounts, Mexican-Hindu couples understood
themselves to have much in common in terms of cultural characteristics1
and long-term goals despite barriers of language and religion.'
Culturally, both these men and women were almost exclusively from
agricultural backgrounds. Their accounts point to the similarity of cuisine,

97. See Mae Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIsT. 67, 67-92 (1999).
98. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 114-16.
99. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 114-16.
100. See generally id.
101. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 113-17.
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such as breads (tortillas and rotis), and spices.10 2 It is also the case that the
women, once married, would begin to "cook" Hindu, by which I infer that
they mean Punjabi cuisine.' 0 3 They point to similarities in culture 10 4 and
economic goals.
These commonalities are perhaps very important in understanding how
they worked to give these partnerships a "common" subjectivity or
consciousness, especially when contrasted to the rhetoric of race and
miscegenation of the day: The origins of 'miscegenation' (defined as
mixing of two genuses) connote blending or corruption.10 5 Mating would
pollute the purity of a race, it would introduce unwelcome traits into a
group that had hitherto been whole and clean and complete, namely the
white race. The races - understood as such - were to be kept separate.
Asian-Indians and presumably for Mexican women (and men) may not
have been recognized or even already interpellated, but they knew
generally that both the law and their surrounding communities were not
necessarily all on their side. They also understood that, depending upon
their actions, they stood to be penalized. And in many respects, they
were - by civil mobs, and by lack of police protection from civic
authorities, labor unions, xenophobic white neighbors and from their
sympathetic law-enforcing friends and neighbors.
In this light, one can begin to see how Mexican women and Asian
Indian men might begin to make sense of a potential union, whether they
rationalized or sincerely thought that these commonalities had some more
fundamental ground. They emphasized how similar they were to each
other - perhaps similar enough to merge customs, language, cuisine,
money, and labor. As they brought a new generation into the world, they
forged a new culture that would begin to represent who they were and the
logic of their symbiosis in a world that was hostile to the transgression of
racial purity. In short, they began to see themselves as being of a
similar - if not identical - peoples: of Mexican-Hindus. This is not to
argue for some ideal notion of romantic love as the basis for these unions;
if anything, the evidence suggests that the motivations for each half of
these couples was the same as it has been for marriage alliances across
centuries, geographies, and cultures: a combination of pragmatic, selfinterested, and idealistic reasons.
Indeed, these alliances were
characterized by features similar to those in any other society: jealousy,
treachery, deception, and self-protection, as well as an investment in the

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.

105. Geoffrey Nefi, Of Mongrels and Men: The Shared Ideology of Anti-Miscegenation
Law, Chinese Exclusion, and Contemporary American Neo-Nativism 6 (BePress Legal
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possibility of a less stark future marked by social, political, and economic
security, if not prosperity.
In this sense, the Mexican-Hindu couples forged a set of community
alliances and loyalties that served them constructively as the passage of two
successive laws intended to disfranchise immigrants were passed: the
1913106 and 1920107 Alien Land Acts, along with several amendments. The
1913 Alien Land Act would work to disfranchise Punjabi farmers, along
with other inhabitants of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean descent. 10 8 They
were in danger of losing the land that they had worked so hard to purchase.
In addition, this law rendered it difficult to rent farmland for more than
three years at a time. The 1913 Alien act was succeeded by a second land
law:
The 1920 Initiative barred guardianships and trusteeships in the
name of "aliens ineligible to citizenship" who would be prohibited
from owning such properties, barred all leases of agricultural land,
barred corporations with a majority of shareholders who were
"aliens ineligible to citizenship" from owning agricultural land and
' 10 9
classified sharecropping contracts as "interests in land."
These land acts, ostensibly aimed at the Japanese, caught Asian Indians
in their dragnet as well. The acts barred them first from owning, then
leasing for longer periods, then finally from passing their property on
sympathetic colleagues or associates who might hold them in trust for
them.
Before the second Alien Land Act was passed, the 1917 Asiatic Barred
Zone Act was passed, prohibiting immigration from most locales in Asia. 110
After both land acts were passed, a 1920 deportation bill was passed,"1
through which 100 Indians were deported - none of them the explicit
target of the bill, which was aimed at aliens convicted of crimes during the
war.'12 In 1924, the Immigration Act (or the Johnson-Reed Act)1 13 was
passed, barring Japanese, Filipinos, and other Asians (aliens "ineligible for
citizenship") from immigrating. Finally, other various amendments were
passed to bar Indians among other aliens from being naturalized and finally
from inter-marrying (in 1931).
There is also another aspect to consider: the way that their social
networks were formed through their kin and friendships. Mexican women

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
64-01
111.
112.
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1913 Cal. Stat. ccvi, reprintedin CAL. GEN. LAWS Act. 129 (Deering 1916).
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See 1913 Cal. Stat. ccvi.
Aoki, supra note 52, at 57, 57 n.58.
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(2003).
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married the friends or brothers of their sister's Indian husband;' 14 similarly,
the Indian male friends of Punjabi-Mexican couples might marry their
Mexican "sister-in-law's" friends, daughters or nieces. 1 5 Among other
implications, these men and women decided to forge intimate, economic,
and social alliances that were based
on dedication and loyalty - although
16
not always observed by everyone.'
Not all of these marriages lasted, but there are distinct records of a
number that did, and in which Mexican women kept the property, titles,
deeds, and accounts acquired by their spouses in their own names, as
Punjabi men were forced to divest their names from their property until
such times as their children were old enough to take over these
responsibilities." 7 Thus, they forged their collective-racial identities from
the interstices of racial and miscegenation laws that appeared to overlook
them; similarly, they also took their cues from patriarchal culture of
inheritance in order to protect, sustain, and reproduce themselves, -but also
from certain "liberatory" laxities - their spouses appeared to admire their
independence, their ability to take on "male" responsibilities." 8
These couples raised their children as Catholics. The children learned
some Punjabi and spoke English and Spanish. They learned some Punjabi
customs and ate Punjabi cuisine, even as they worked the land with their
fathers, Indian "uncles," Mexican friends and relatives, and white
acquaintances. Mexican-Hindu daughters grew to learn some of the
couture during "ethnic" heritage celebrations. And they took on the
appellation of Hindu, even as it was a misnomer in the overwhelming
majority of cases. It became a proxy term for the race that they
"descended" from, in the way that Mexican Hindu was the term for the race
that they would become.
But does this suffice to identify Mexican Hindus as a "race"? It is
important to remember that even though the law overlooked them, it didn't
really. They knew that they existed on barely on the other side of being
outcast and marginalized; how they acted to circumvent the law's wrath
would have much influence on how and whether they were able to sustain
themselves, their futures, and their livelihood. Rather than attract attention
by turning to those racial groups whose features - the primary evidence of
one's race - were markedly different from their own, they sought to stay
in the shadows of the miscegenation laws by finding others with whom
they would attract little attention. Indeed, some proof of their success can
be found in the fact that even though women who married aliens ineligible

114. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 90-95.
115. Id.
116. There were instances of adultery, treachery and deceit, as can be found in any
community. See id. at 104.
117. See id. at 90-95.
118. See id.
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for naturalization ran the risk of becoming ineligible to own property, the
state did not enforce this prohibition against Mexican women.
Having argued that they transformed themselves into a racialized
subjectivity, I want to point out that this racialization was neither clear-cut,
nor long-lasting: there were in-fights and divisions among Punjabi men who was lower caste, or who was Muslim and not Sikh. There were
racially divisive distinctions transmitted from parents to children: PunjabiMexican children were warned not to talk to Mexican kids, or even other
Punjabi-Mexican children who might have been poorer or Muslim." 9
Combined with some of my other research, this tells me that at some point
they felt comfortable enough having escaped the wrath of law
that they did
20
folks.1
brown
other
with
commonalities
their
see
to
need
not
That suspicion might be borne out by the fact the next generation
sometimes did and sometimes did not marry other Mexican Hindus. 12In1
1948, with the California Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Sharp,
the first set of anti-miscegenation laws began to be repealed. In 1936, the
Cable Act 122 which stripped American women who married aliens
ineligible for citizenship of their citizenship, was repealed. In 1952, the
Walter-McCarran Act 123 was passed, allowing first generation Asian
Americans to apply for citizenship again. The Alien Land Acts were
invalidated in 1946 by the U.S. Supreme Court. 124 All this is to say that the
population and collective consciousness of this particular group - which
was induced, generated, and created by law - gradually faded, as Mexican
Hindus as a group faded, and as new populations began to be ostracized,
racialized, and held up for persecution. Laws change, but racialization in some basic sense - never does.
Along with a historical telescope, perhaps, we can begin to find new
ways to understand subjectivity - through the spaces where law does and
doesn't recognize certain populations. One way forward is to ask questions
that are all too familiar to folks who work in Diaspora studies - although
less familiar for philosophers, and even less so for legal theorists. These
questions include some of the following: what is one's sense of being (illbeing, well-being) when one is not recognized by law, where does one
119.
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supra note 1, at 97-99.

120. As I argue elsewhere, when those who have been the targets of persecution or
racialized persecution are no longer under the same dire threat under the law, they will often
become part of the dominant population that deploys tactics to marginalize others. See
SHETH, supra note 20, at 129-45.
121. 32Cal.2d711,731.
122. Cable Act of 1922, Pub. L.No. 67-346 (2003).
123. Walter-McCarran: Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also known as the
Walter-McCarran Act of 1952), Pub. L. No. 82-414 (2006) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1778 (2010)).
124. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 663 (1948), struck down certain provisions of the
1913 and 1920 Alien Land Acts; Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952) (overturned
in 1956).
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stand when one is not interpellated? Does it mean that one doesn't exist, or
does it allow for the possibility that one's existence can be found in
connection to others who also stand in the shadows, in order to finally
forge a new self-recognition, a new form of subjectivity, or even a new
racial self-recognition? And finally, as scholars in Ethnic Studies often
ask, what is the self-perceived relationship of one group to another
population? Where do they see themselves standing - ahead or behind,
above or below? How do such self-perceptions tie into other, more public,
more common, perceptions? As we try to understand these populations,
who have been covered up by history and by absence of proper theoretical
lenses by which to recognize them as they should be understood, it might
be time for a renewed attention to theory - to do theory so that theory
doesn't do us.

